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The Future of Customary Law in Namibia:
A Call for an Integration Model
By LYNN BERAT*
INTRODUCTION
In many respects, the Namibian Constitution of 1990 is a model for
the world.' The eighty-page document, which represents the first time
the African people of an African country drafted their own constitution,
is replete with human rights guarantees. Among the rights protected are
fundamental freedoms, 2 life,3 liberty,4 and human dignity.5 Also guaran-
teed is the right to culture. According to article 19,
[e]very person shall be entitled to enjoy, practice, profess, maintain and
promote any culture, language, tradition or religion subject to the
terms of this Constitution and further subject to the condition that the
rights protected by this Article do not impinge upon the rights of
others or the national interest.
6
Although not explicitly mentioned, there is support for the proposition
that culture includes the right to customary law. 7 The Constitution,
however, does not address the issue. It indicates that the Constitution is
the supreme law;8 and that there will be a Supreme Court, High Court,
and lower courts "subject only to this Constitution and the law." 9 It
* J.D., 1983 Texas; Ph.D. 1988, Yale. Member of the Texas Bar. The author, a Lec-
turer in Law and the Assistant Coordinator of the Career Development Fellowship Program
for Southern Africans at Yale, is also a regular consultant to the Ford Foundation on South
African and Namibian issues.
1. NAMIn. CONsr. (1990).
2. L. art. 21.
3. Id. art 6.
4. Id. arL 7.
5. Id. art 8.
6. Id. art. 19.
7. See generally FRANCESCO CAPOTORTI, STUDY ON THE RIGH*S OF PERSONs BE-
LONGING TO ETHNIC, RELIGIOUS AND LINGUISTIC MINORITIES, U.N. Doe. E/CN.4/Sub.2/
384/Rev.1, U.N. Sales No. E.78.XIV.1 (1979); JOSE IR MARTINEZ COBO, STUDY OF THE
PROBLEM OF DISCRIMINATION AGAINST INDIGENOUS POPULATIONS, U.N. Doe. E/CN.4/
Sub.2/1986/7/Add.4, U.N. Sales No. E.86.XIV.3 (1986).
8. See NAMIB. CONST., Preamble.
9. Id. art. 78(2).
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further provides that pre-independence laws governing jurisdiction,
standing, procedure, and powers of the Court remain in force unless re-
pealed or amended by Parliament.10 With regard to customary law, arti-
cle 66 specifically provides that:
(1) Both the customary law and the Common law of Namibia in force
at the time of Independence shall remain valid to the extent to which
such customary or common law does not conflict with this Constitu-
tion or any other statutory law.
(2) Subject to the terms of this Constitution, it shall be competent by
act of Parliament for any part of such common law or customary law
to be repealed or modified, or for the application thereof to be confined
to particular parts of Namibia or for particular periods.'1
The only other references to customary law govern citizenship12 and
family relations. According to article 4(3)(b), "a marriage by customary
law shall be deemed to be a marriage; provided that nothing in this Con-
stitution shall preclude Parliament from enacting legislation which de-
fines the requirements which need to be satisfied for a marriage by
customary law to be recognised as such .... ,3 While these provisions,
taken together, point to the continued existence of customary law, its
precise nature remains a vexing issue.
This Article explores the avenues open to the Namibian Govern-
ment in its search for an equitable legal system and proposes an integra-
tion model for the country. Part I examines the international position of
customary law. Part II considers the treatment of customary law else-
where in Africa and gives particular attention to the quest for unification
of laws and legal systems. Part III examines the experience of legal dual-
ism in Namibia's neighbors, Swaziland, Lesotho, and Botswana. Part IV
recognizes that although unification is a long-term goal for Namibia, it is
impractical at present. Therefore, an integration model, half-way along
the spectrum from dualism to unification, is offered as the best solution
to the problems currently facing the country.
I. THE INTERNATIONAL POSITION OF
CUSTOMARY LAW
In recent years, governments around the world have shown consid-
erable interest in customary, or indigenous, law. This interest affects the
10. Id. art. 138(2)(a).
11. Id. art. 66.
12. See id. art. 4(3)(b); see generally Chapter 2 of the Namibian Constitution, which deals
with citizenship matters.
13. Id. art. 4(3)(b).
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development of both national and international policies. Besides domes-
tic organizations tied to national governments, 14 a number of private and
public international organizations are also examining issues involving the
use of customary law. These include the North American Working
Group of the Commission on Folk Law and Legal Pluralism"5 and the
Working Group on Indigenous Populations of the United Nations
Human Rights Commission. 6 In the international sphere, the use of
customary law is clearly protected as a matter of international human
rights law which guarantees indigenous peoples the right to enjoy their
culture, including the use of their own law.
The legal position of customary law is derived from the incorpora-
tion of the right of non-discrimination into the jus cogens in the post-
World War II period. 7 In a departure from the Covenant of the League
of Nations, the United Nations Charter propounded universal respect for
human rights and fundamental freedoms, including equality and non-dis-
crimination.18 Non-discrimination was included in the context of pro-
tecting human rights and fundamental freedoms for all, not just minority
groups. Similarly, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948
did not include any references to members of ethnic, linguistic, or reli-
gious minorities. 9 The United Nations has, however, in certain in-
stances, concerned itself with the position of minorities.2" With the
adoption of the Charter, the Universal Declaration, and other instru-
14. An example is the Australian Law Reform Commission. Its recent work with regard
to customary law is found in THE LAW REFORM COMM'N, THE RECOGNITION OF ABORIGI-
NAL CUSTOMARY LAWS (1986).
15. The Working Group involves individuals who deal with Native American common
law on a professional basis.
16. See The Problem of Indigenous Populations, ES.C. Res. 1589, U.N. ESCOR, 50th
Sess., Supp. 1, at 16, U.N. Doc. E/5044 (1971); Working Group on Indigenous Populations at
the United Nations Human Rights Commission, E.S.C. Res. 1982/34, U.N. ESCOR, Supp. No.
1, at 26, U.N. Doc. E/1982/59 (1982).
17. Jus cogens may be defined as basic, fundamental, imperative, or overriding rules of
international law, peremptory norms "which cannot be set aside by treaty or acquiescence but
only by the formation of a subsequent norm of Contrary effect." Ian Brownlie quoted in LYNN
BERAT, WALvis BAY, DECOLONIZATIONATION AND INTERNATIONAL LAw 146 (1990).
18. U.N. CHARTER, art. 1. The Charter is discussed in greater detail in BERAT, supra
note 17, at 141-42.
19. Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. Doc. A/810,
at 71 (1948).
20. See, eg., the following publications of the U.N. Commission on Human Rights Sub-
Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities: Study of the legal
validity of the undertakings concerning minorities, U.N. ESCOR, 6th Sess. U.N. DoM. E/CN.4/
367 (1950); Activities of organs of the United Nations in the field ofprevention of discrimination
and protection of minorities, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/81,84,83,86 (1949); Activities of the
United Nations relating to the protection of minorities, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/194 (1958).
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ments, the protection of minorities ceased to be a problem restricted to
certain areas of the world. Rather, it became a question concerning all
states and one whose solution must be found in the broader context of
iespect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. Thus, for example,
article 27 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of
1966 indicates that persons belonging to minority groups have the right
to enjoy their own culture, religion, and language31 Such rights for mi-
norities, however, clearly place demands on the state with regard to all
groups in society; it would be inconceivable that a state could have obli-
gations toward its minorities that it did not have to its people in general.
In this context, customary law merits protection as part of a people's
culture.
The post-1950 emergence of the right to culture gives additional
strength to the argument that states are bound to foster, not merely toler-
ate, customary law. Indeed, many conferences held under United Na-
tions Economic, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO)
auspices have emphasized the central place of governments in promoting
cultural development. Participants at a 1965 UNESCO seminar on mul-
tinational society urged "recognition of the importance of maintaining
permissible legal traditions in fields such as laws of succession, marriage,
dietary law, [etc.]."22 In discussing limitations which should be placed
on traditional group customs, they unanimously stated "that nothing
should be prohibited unless it threatened the freedom of others or was
contrary to public order, morality or health-in the sense of constituting
an offense known to the law-or conflicted with the technological, social
or economic advancement of the nation as a whole."23
The 1970 Intergovernmental Conference on Institutional, Adminis-
trative and Financial Aspects of Cultural Policies stressed that all gov-
ernments have responsibility for the adequate financing and appropriate
planning of cultural institutions and programs. 24 Two years later, the
Intergovernmental Conference on Cultural Policies in Europe indicated
that:
The right to culture implies a duty for governments and for the inter-
national community to make it possible for everyone, without distinc-
tion or discrimination of any kind, to take part in the cultural life of his
21. U.N. Covenants on Human Rights, reprinted in 6 I.L.M. 360, 375 (1967).
22. Seminar on the Multi-National Society, U.N. Economic, Scientific and Cultural Or-
ganization, U.N. Doc. ST/TAO/HR/23 (1965).
23. Id. para. 115.
24. Final Report on the Intergovernmental Conference on Institutional, Administrative,
and Financial Aspects of Cultural Policies, U.N. Doc. SHC/MD/20 (1972).
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community and of mankind generally. For this universal participation
to be effective, the State must furnish the necessary means ...
In 1974, a seminar on the promotion and protection of the human rights
of national, ethnic, and other minorities held in Ohrid, Yugoslavia
deemed it "the responsibility of the authorities to guarantee in law and in
practice the maintenance and preservation of such traditions and cus-
toms and to provide for their autonomous development, where necessary
by public financing."26 The pronouncements made at these conferences
and contained in international instruments, as well as in the constitutions
and domestic laws of many states, make it clear that the right to enjoy
culture is guaranteed by international law and thus binds all states, in-
cluding Namibia.
Given the expressed Namibian commitment to promoting the cul-
ture of all groups, and therefore, their customary law, the government
must negotiate through the minefield of dangers associated with an at-
tempt to create a system of customary law truly representative of and
responsive to the needs of the people. Merely to accept the perverse body
of law designated as customary by white colonial anthropologists--Ger-
man or South African-will do nothing to advance the culture of indige-
nous groups. However, it may be exceedingly difficult, if not impossible,
to discern what exactly the customary law is because it, by its nature, is
in a greater state of flux than written law.
IH. THE AFRICAN EXPERIENCE: ATTEMPTS
AT UNIFICATION
In light of the difficulty of articulating customary law and the
problems of creating cohesiveness and a national identity in a society
where for decades German and South African occupiers implemented a
strategy of divide and rule, there are many who do not believe that the
constitution's protection of customary law is a good thing. Over the
years some scholars and politicians have advocated unification rather
than dualism. Among them have been the colonial overlords who once
ruled Africa. Thus, as the British Empire began to be dismantled, the
London Conference on the Future of Law in Africa, held from December
1959 to January 1960 and chaired by Lord Denning, concluded that:
25. Intergovernmental Conference on Cultural Policies in Europe, U.N. Doe. SHC/
EUROCULT/I, para. 7 (1972).
26. Seminar on the Promotion and Protection of the Human Rights of National, Ethnic and
Other Minorities, U.N. Economic, Scientific and Cultural Organization, U.N. Doc. ST/TAO/
HR/49 (1974) reprinted in THE OHND SEMINAR 40 (Boris Vishinski ed., 1977).
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[U]niformity of law would undoubtedly make a valuable contribution
to the administration of the law, and is therefore desirable in princi-
ple.... [B]etween communities and areas there are many variations-
especially in native law and custom which could and should be elimi-
nated, thereby creating a greater degree of uniformity than at present
exists.
2 7
It should be added that not all the participants were representatives of
the former colonial power. Certain African lawyers and judges were
present, but they had been trained in the British system and were not
necessarily sympathetic to the needs of those for whom customary law
continued to be a part of daily existence.
Throughout the developing world, the requirements of moderniza-
tion or the necessity of fostering national unity are reasons governments
often cite for abandoning customary law and replacing it with a single,
national system.28 In many African states, governments view customary
law with hostility. Since the colonizers applied customary law on a ra-
cial basis, many Africans consider its use to be tainted by discrimination
and antithetical to the goals of African nationalism. Many nationalists
see it as representative of the old, unprogressive order, while both capi-
talist and socialist western law have been seen as representing the forces
of modernity, especially in the civil and economic axenas.
Various African countries dispensed with customary law because
their regimes felt that such law was a colonial relic. Often new govern-
ments have dealt with customary law through codification. In western
law, Justinian's Corpus Juris Civilis29 and the Code Napoldon 30 are prime
examples of the desire to harmonize. African codification commissions
typically have adopted one of two methods of treating customary law in
their search for its appropriate role in the new legal order. First, as in
Ethiopia, they have endeavored to change the entire legal system dramat-
ically by virtually abolishing customary law. Displaying a remarkable
lack of cultural sensitivity, the French drafter of the Ethiopian Civil
Code believed that "it is not an evolution that the country needs, it is a
27. Quoted in Antony N. Allott, What is to be Done with African Customary Law? The
Experience of Problems and Reforms in Anglophone Africa from 1950, 28 J. Ar-R. L. 56, 64
(1984).
28. See infra notes 31-32 and accompanying text.
29. The Roman Emperor Justinian's Corpus furls Civilis is divided into four parts: 1) The
Institutiones, 2) The Digesta or Pandecta, 3) The Codex, and 4) The Novellac. For a further
discussion of the Corpus luris Civilis, see Stephen Sass, Medieval Roman Law: A Guide to the
Sources and Literature, 58 LAW LIB. J. 130 (1965).
30. The CODE NAPOLtON was promulgated in 1804.
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revolution."31 In his view, customary law was not stable, was not really
jurisprudential, and differed too greatly from place to place. He also ar-
gued that it was responsible for Ethiopian underdevelopment. Therefore,
Ethiopia cannot wait 300 or 500 years to construct in an empirical
fashion a system of law which is unique to itself, as was done.., by the
Romans and the English. The development and modernization of
Ethiopia necessitate the adoption of a 'ready-made' system; they force
the reception of a foreign system of law in such a manner as to assure
as quickly as possible a minimal security in legal relations.
32
With such views, it is not surprising that the resulting code was a
synthetic work based on the civil codes of Italy, France, Switzerland,
Greece, and Egypt.33 The only concession to Ethiopian customary law
was that no law which was entirely antithetical to Ethiopian values
would be incorporated into the Code. Even this grudging acknowledge-
ment of customary law was to be permitted only if the customary prac-
tice was followed widely, in harmony with the Ethiopian concept of
justice, in accordance with economic progress, and clear enough to be
committed to civil law terminology.
34
The second approach to codification has been to create a code that
closely follows customary law. This sympathetic approach, which curi-
ously often has enjoyed more initial support from western scholars than
from African politicians, derives from the feeling that customary law best
mirrors the social realities in which the people find themselves and com-
ports with their value systems. The 1959 Madagascar Code which incor-
porated customary law was representative of this view.35 That Code
furnished the country with "unified legislation, adapted to the customs of
the different populations of Madagascar and accepted by them."36 How-
ever, the Code was not a retention of customary law. It too, in a less
pernicious way than in Ethiopia, was a change from the existing custom-
ary law. In Madagascar, the change was evolutionary while in Ethiopia
it was revolutionary. Hence, customary law was modified to harmonize
conflicting rules, to remove aspects deemed unacceptable by the central
government, and, in certain instances, to consolidate it with civil law.
31. Rent David, La Refonte du Code Civil dans les EtatsAfricaines, 1962 ANN. AFR. 160,
161 (translation by Lynn Berat).
32. Ren6 David, A Civil Code for Ethiopia: Considerations on the Codification of Mhe Cizl
Law in African Countries, 37 TUL. L. REv. 187, 188-89 (1962).
33. KENNETH R. REDDEN, THE LEGAL SYSTEM OF ETHIOPIA 53-54 (196S)
34. Id
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Whether the treatment of customary law was radical or more mod-
erate, such efforts generally have been doomed. While there have been
few scholarly studies of the Ethiopian and Madagascan experiences, in-
formation now available points to an unsuccessful trend. In addition,
some scholars of customary law in Africa draw parallels to the 1926 in-
troduction of the Swiss Civil Code into Turkey.37 The Code was only
adequate for the urban elites and members of the legal profession. The
vast majority of the people neither understood nor used it.
In these cases, local custom may continue to be followed despite the
government's pronouncements. It is unrealistic to think that people will
suddenly abandon their traditions because of an edict from a remote cen-
tral government. Attempts to remove customary law in this manner-
and thereby undermine the power of the traditional authorities who up-
hold it-may have the opposite effect from that intended. Namely, they
may cause great resentment on the part of the populations whose law is
challenged and, instead of fostering national unity, invigorate separatist
claims. Another reason that codification attempts often do not succeed is
that African countries typically have a high illiteracy rate.38 Therefore,
written codes have no attraction for the people. This would be particu-
larly true in Namibia where the most optimistic estimates put the literacy
rate at forty percent.39
It would, of course, be possible to unify customary laws only. The
argument advanced for this is that differences in customary law divide
the country. In the 1960s the Tanzanian government, with the express
objective of fostering national unity, began a unification program which
produced only superficial uniformity." Although conflicts between types
of customary law are possible, for example when people of different
groups marry, they seem insignificant when compared to the more sub-
stantial conflict between customary law and western-type national law.41
37. For a general overview of the effects of the introduction of Swiss law in Turkey see
Symposium, The Reception of Foreign Law in Turkey, 9 INT'L SOC. SCI. BULL. 7 (1957); see
also Keuning, Some Remarks on Law and Courts in Africa, in INTEGRATION OF CUSTOMARY
AND MODERN LEGAL SYSTEMS IN AFRICA, A CONFERENCE HELD AT IBADAN ON 24Thl TO
26TH AUGUST 1964, at 64 (Institute of African Studies, University of Ife ed. 1972).
38. It seems likely that among the "literate" there are large numbers of functional
illiterates.
39. Namibia's problems in education are described in INTERNTIONAL DEFENSE AND
AID FUND FOR SOUTHERN AFRICA, NAMIBIA: THE FACTS 19 (1980).
40. See generally Yash Ghai, Ethnicity and Group Relations, in Two STUDIES ON ETHNIC
GROUP RELATIONS IN AFRICA: SENEGAL, THE UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA 107-09
(UNESCO ed., 1974).
41. This article will use the terms "customary law" and "customary courts" and "na-
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Such conflicts will continue to occur if customary law is made uniform or
codified.
Thus, as Namibians struggle to come to terms with their new Con-
stitution and as their Government works to instill a new respect for the
rule of law, it would be fatal for the Government to attempt to unify the
laws prematurely. Such a move would create social dislocation by under-
mining the power bases of the keepers of customary law, the so-called
traditional authorities, whose support Namibian political parties assidu-
ously sought in the months leading to Namibia's 1989 election. In order
to avoid a socio-legal cataclysm, the Namibian Government should in-
stead maintain legal dualism as have some of its neighbors with similar
legal pasts.
I. LEGAL DUALISM IN SOUTHERN AFRICA: THE
EXPERIENCE OF SWAZILAND, LESOTHO,
AND BOTSWANA
A. The Rise of a Hybrid Legal System
The western system of law which Namibia acquired at independence
is a hybrid similar to those inherited by Swaziland,42 Lesotho,4 3 and Bot-
swana.' All these derived their peculiar character from South African
law.45 South Africa's hybrid or mixed legal system contains three main
elements: Roman,' Roman-Dutch,47 and English law.4" Roman law
evolved over twelve centuries from around 753 B.C., the traditional date
of the founding of Rome, to the date of the death of the Emperor Justin-
ian in A.D. 565. Roman law survived in medieval Europe and influenced
its traditions. Between the late thirteenth century and the end of the
sixteenth century, Roman law entered into the law of the Netherlands.
tional law" and "national courts." National law and national courts are often referred to in the
literature as general law and general courts.
42. See infra notes 76-111 and accompanying text.
43. See infra notes 112-38 and accompanying text.
44. See infra notes 139-95 and accompanying text.
45. South Africa's mixed system is discussed in Imre Zajtay & W.L. Hasten, The Perma-
nence of Roman Law Concepts in the Continental Legal System and South African Law, 2
COMP. & INT'L L.L S. AFR. 181, 197 (1969); see also WJ. HOsTEN eLaL, INTRODUCTION to
SoUTH AiuCAN LAW AND LEGAL THEORY 133 (1980) [hereinafter HOSTEN].
46. See generally WOLFGANG KUNKEL, AN INTRODUCTION To ROMAN LEGAL AND
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY (J.M. Kelly trans., 1973); FRITz SCHULTZ, HtsTORY OF ROMAN
LEGAL SCIENCE (1946).
47. HOSTEN, supra note 45, at 175-76.
48. On English law, see J.W. GOUGH, FUNDAMENTAL LAW IN ENGLISH CONSTITU-
TIONAL HISTORY (1985).
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Roman-Dutch law is a synthesis of Roman law, Germanic customary
law, feudal law, canon law, and perhaps even some natural law concepts.
It enjoyed its classical period from the sixteenth to the late eighteenth
centuries.49
The Dutch East India Company brought this classical Roman-
Dutch law with it when it established a presence at the Cape of Good
Hope in the seventeenth century.50 Roman-Dutch law continued as the
common law of the Cape during the period of Company rule from 1652
to 1795. 11 When Britain occupied the Cape in 1795, the Articles of Ca-
pitulation empowered the Raad van Justitie, renamed the Court of Jus-
tice, to administer Roman-Dutch law in civil and criminal matters.52
After a brief interlude from 1803 to 1806, British rule became permanent
in 1806.53
British ascendancy did not signal the end of Roman-Dutch law at
the Cape. The Cape Articles of Capitulation of January 1806 provided
that "the burghers and inhabitants shall preserve all their rights and priv-
ileges which they have enjoyed hitherto."54 Some scholars have argued
that this provision ensured the perpetuation of Roman-Dutch law."
Even if that was not the intention of the Articles, the well-established
principle of English law that "the laws of a conquered country continue
in force, until they are altered by the conqueror. . .," protected Roman-
Dutch law.5 6 However, the legal system at the Cape did not escape Eng-
lish influences. Indeed, the British Government envisioned a process of
gradual assimilation. In 1826 a two-man commission, appointed by the
British Government three years prior to inquire into the affairs of the
49. On Roman-Dutch law, see Lee, The Roman-Dutch Law in South Africa: The Iftfluence
of English Law, I COLOMBO. L. REv. 1 (1969).
50. LEONARD THOMPSON, A HISTORY OF SOUTH AFRICA 41-43 (1990) [hereinafter A
HISTORY OF SoUTH AFRICA].
51. For studies of the Cape Colony during the Dutch period, see THE SHAPING OF SOUTH
AFRICAN SOCIETY, 1652-1840 (Richard Elphick & Hermann Gilionice eds., 2d ed. 1988).
52. HOSTEN, supra note 45, at 195.
53. Cape Colony, Articles of Capitulation, Jan. 18, 1806, reprinted in 1 THE CAPE OF
GOOD HOPE GOVERNMENT PROCLAMATIONS FROM 1806 TO 1825, at 4 (Walter Harding ed,,
1838).
54. Cape Colony Articles of Capitulation, Jan. 10, 1806.
55. H.D.J. Bodenstein, English Influences on the Common Law of South Africa, 32 S.
AFR. L.J. 337, 338 (1915); J.C. De Wet, "Nederlandse"Reg in Suid.4frika to 1806, 21 TYD-
SKRIF VIR HEDENDAAGSE ROMEINS-HOLLANDSE REG 162, 171 n.2 (1958) [hereinafter Do
Wet]; J.C. De Wet Die Romeins-Hollandse reg in Suid Afrika Na 1806, 21 TYDSKZRIF Vlt
HEDENDAAGSE ROMEINS-HOLLANDSE REG 239, 239 n.2 (1958).
56. Campbell v. Hall, 1 Cowp., 204, 209, 98 Eng. Rep. 1045, 1047 (1774). See Do Wet,
supra note 55, at 172.
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Colony, reported on judicial matters at the Cape.-7 It suggested that the
existing procedure be harmonized with English procedure, that future
legislation follow principles of English jurisprudence, and that the Eng-
lish common law be adopted gradually.58
In the years after 1826, numerous legislative changes occurred in
accordance with this policy. The areas of procedure, evidence, and suc-
cession were greatly affected. For example, Ordinance No. 40 of 1828
restyled Cape criminal procedure in the English manner.59 Ordinance
No. 72 of 1830 adopted the English evidence law with minor modifica-
tions."° Civil procedure also experienced a remodelling along English
lines, although some Roman-Dutch procedures remained. Ordinance
No. 104 of 1833 replaced the Roman-Dutch law of universal succession
of heirs with the English system of executorship.6 1 Ordinance No. 15 of
1845 established the English underhand form of will.62 The Law of In-
heritance Amendment Act of 187363 and the Succession Act of 18744
removed various restrictions on testamentary transfers.
English law had an even greater impact in the areas of mercantile
law, company law, and bankruptcy law. Statutes were adopted verbatim
from English law by reference or by repromulgation as Cape statutes.
These included the Merchant Shipping Act of 1855;65 the General Law
Amendment Act of 1879 governing maritime and shipping law, fire, life,
and marine insurance, stoppage in transit, and bills of lading;" Ordi-
nance No. 6 of 1843 governing bankruptcy;' the Joint Stock Companies
Limited Liability Act of 1861,6" and the Companies Act of 1892.69
57. CAPE OF GOOD HOPE, 25 RECORDS OF THE CAPE COLONY, 1 Jan.-6 Feb. 1826, at 44
(George McCall Theal ed., 1905) [hereinafter 25 RECORDS OF THE CAPE COLO,,NY]. See gener-
ally Botha, The Early Influence of the English Law Upon the Roman-Dutch Law in South
Africa, 40 S. APR. L.J 396, 401-03 (1923); 0. SCHREINER, THE CONTRIBUTION OF FNGLISH
LAW TO SOUTH AFRICAN LAW AND THE RULE OF LAW IN SOUTH AFRICA (1967).
58. 25 RECORDS OF THE CAPE COLONY, supra note 57.
59. Ordinance 40 of 1828, reprinted in STATUTE LAW OF THE CAPE OF GOOD HOPE 109
(1862) [hereinafter STATUTE LAW].
60. Ordinance 72 of 1830, reprinted in STATUTE LAW, supra note 59, at 152.
61. Ordinance 104 of 1833, reprinted in STATUTE LAW, supra note 59, at 258
62. Ordinance 15 of 1845, reprinted in STATUTE LAW, supra note 59, at 745.
63. Law of Inheritance Amendment Act, Act 26 of 1873.
64. Succession Act, Act 23 of 1874.
65. Local Merchant Seaman's Act, Act 13 of 1855, reprinted in I STATUTES OF T"IE CNPE
OF GOOD HOPE 1652-1905, at 542 (E.M. Jackson ed., 1906) [hereinafter STATUTES].
66. Reformatory Institutions Act, Act 8 of 1879, reprinted in STATUTES, supra note bS, at
1600.
67. Ordinance 6 of 1843.
68. Joint Stock Companies Act, Act 23 of 1861.
69. Act to Consolidate the Law Relating to Companies, Act 25 of 1892, reprintcd in 2
STATUTES OF THE CAPE OF GOOD HOPE 1652-1905, at 3032 (E.M. Jackson ed., 190b,
1991]
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Beyond this specific legislation, English law made its influence felt in
other ways. English was the language of the courts. English judges oc-
cupied the bench and English legal training was required for advocates.
In addition, the use of the English system of government meant the intro-
duction of English principles of constitutional law. Thus, by the end of
the nineteenth century, Roman-Dutch law remained the basic common
law of the Cape, but it had been greatly influenced by English law.
Meanwhile, in the nineteenth century, this modified form of Roman-
Dutch law spread from the Cape to the Afrikaner Republics of the
Transvaal and the Orange Free State and also to the British colony of
Natal.70 After the South African War (1899-1902),71 when the two for-
mer Afrikaner Republics and the two British colonies joined to form the
Union of South Africa, Roman-Dutch law became the common law of
South Africa.7 2 It remained so after the Union transformed itself into
the Republic of South Africa in 1961. 71 Notwithstanding this, it was
clear that the South African legal system had become a "three-layer
cake" of Roman, Dutch, and English law.74 Britain adopted this system
for Swaziland, Lesotho, and Botswana when it took control of them in
the late nineteenth century. Indeed, the South Africa Act indicated that
the British intended the three to be incorporated into South Africa in the
future.7" However, in addition to accepting the western system as the
national law of those territories, Britain also chose to retain customary
law. This created a dualism in all three states which exists in varying
degrees to the present day.
1. Swaziland
Swaziland, a country of 600,000 people which became independent
in 1968, received foreign law in section 3 of the General Law and Admin-
istration Proclamation of 1907.76 It provided that:
(1) The Roman-Dutch common law, save in so far as the same has
70. For a constitutional history of the Afrikaner republics, see L.M. Thompson, Constitu-
tionalism in the South African Republics, 1954 BUTTERWORTH'S S. AFR. L. RaV. 49.
71. The war is described in Lynn Berat, Constitutionalism and Mineral Law in the Strug.
gle for a New South Africa: the South African War Revisited, 14 SUFFOLK TRANSNT'L L.J.
(forthcoming 1991).
72. See generally Lee, supra note 49.
73. A HISTORY OF SOUTH AFRICA, supra note 50, at 188.
74. Zajtay & Hosten, supra note 45, at 197.
75. The South Africa Act is discussed at length in LEONARD TIOMPSON, THE UNIFICA-
TION OF SOUTH AFRICA 1902-1910, at 398-407 (1960).
76. General Law and Administration Proclamation (1907) (Swaz.), reprinted in 1 LAWS
OF SWAZILAND, REVISED EDITION OF 1959, at 40 (A.C. Thompson ed., 1960) [hereinafter
LAWS OF SWAZILAND]. Histories of Swaziland include ALLAN R. BOOTH, SWAZILAND:
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been heretofore or may from time to time hereafter be modified by
statute, shall be the law in Swaziland.
(2) Save and except in so far as the same have been repealed or
amended the statutes in force in the Transvaal on the 15th day of Oc-
tober, 1904, and the statutory regulations thereunder, shall mutatis
mutandis and as far as they may be applicable be in force in Swaziland
77
Swazi customary law, in contrast, is not statutorily defined. It can
be nebulously defined as the laws and customs of the Swazi which are not
repugnant to "natural justice or morality. '78  Such a vague statement
makes the judge's personal standards of natural justice and morality de-
terminative. Since judges are often white, in Swaziland as in many Afri-
can countries, this offers a way for the national courts to strike down
many aspects of customary law. It is remarkable, therefore, that the
High Court has only twice commented upon the repugnancy clause, both
times in dicta, once by a black Swazi judge and once by a white expatri-
ate judge.79
In fact, the Government, which is dominated by the monarchy, has
great respect for customary law. Section 62(2) of the 1968 Constitution,
under which Swaziland became independent, prohibited legislative inter-
ference with a number of customary institutions.8 " These were: the re-
gency;"' the offices of the King and Queen Mother; 2 the composition
and rules of procedure of the Swazi National Council;8 3 the appointment
and removal of chiefs;8 4 the regimental system; 5 and the first fruits cere-
mony. 6 In 1973 a royal proclamation repealed the 1968 constitution. 7
TRADITION AND CHANGE IN A SOUTHERN AFRICAN KINGDOM (1983); J.M. MATSEULA, A
HtsTORY OF SWAZILAND (2d ed. 1976); JoAN ScuTT, THE STORY OF SWAZILAND (1983).
77. General Law and Administration Proclamation, supra note 76, §§ 1-2.
78. Swazi Courts Act 80 of 1950, § 10(a)(Swaz.), reprinted in LAwS OF SWAZILAND.
supra note 76, at 446.
79. See Dlamini v. Twala, 1979-81 S.L.R. 117; R. v. Mhlabane, 1977-78 S.L.L 188.
80. SWAZILAND INDEPENDENCE CONSTITUTION OF 1968 § 62(2), reprinted in 2 CoNSTI-








87. King's Proclamation to the Nation, Apr. 12, 1973 (Swaz.) hereinafter King's Proc.].
On the repeal of the Independence Constitution, see Peter Nanyenya Takirambudde, External
Law and Social Structure in an African Context. An Essay About Normative Imposition and
Survival in Swaziland, 16 COMP. INT'L L.J. S.A. 209 (1983).
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The King's Proclamation to the Nation then became the country's
supreme law."8 It did not refer to section 62(2) because Parliament had
been disbanded. Parliament reemerged with the 1978 Establishment of
the Parliament of Swaziland Order.89 Three years later, the King's Proc-
lamation (Amendment) Decree altered the 1973 Proclamation. 90 Retro-
active to 1979, the new decree referred to the customary institutions
enumerated in the 1968 Constitution as "matters [which] shall continue
to be regulated by Swazi law and custom.... " 91 Then, in 1983, another
amendment to the King's 1973 Proclamation indicated that those cus-
tomary matters were beyond the jurisdiction of the national courts.
92
The co-existence of customary and national law has given rise to a
dual court system, problems of proof of customary law, and confusing
conflict of law rules. The court system of Swaziland is controlled by the
Swazi Courts Act of 1950.93 There are national courts from which ap-
peal lies to the High Court. There are also Judicial Commissioner's
courts and Swazi courts. The former is a colonial relic staffed by civil
servants who are usually foreigners and who are neither lawyers nor indi-
viduals trained in Swazi customary law.94 The latter deal with custom-
ary law.95 National law is the primary law in the national courts.
Customary law is the primary law in the Judicial Commissioner's and
Swazi courts, although Swazi courts can be given statutory permission to
hear matters involving the national law.96 In civil cases, appeals from the
customary courts are to the Higher Swazi Court of Appeal and then to
the High Court; in criminal matters, customary court appeals are to the
Higher Swazi Court of Appeal, then to the Judicial Commissioner's
Court, and then to the High Court. The Swazi courts' inferiority to the
general courts was made clear by Chief Justice Nathan who indicated
that:
Although a certain degree of autonomy is conferred by the legislature
upon the Swazi National Courts, they are not a law unto themselves;
they are a limb of the administration of justice in this kingdom, and
they must work in harmony and in conjunction with other limbs
88. King's Proclamation to the Nation, Apr. 12, 1973.
89. Establishment of the Parliament of Swaziland Order 23 of 1978 (Swaz.).
90. King's Proclamation (Amendment) Decree I of 1981 (Swaz.).
91. Id.
92. King's Proclamation (Amendment) Decree 1 of 1983 (Swaz.).
93. Swazi Courts Act 80 of 1950, reprinted in Laws of Swaziland, supra note 76, at 446.





thereof, notably the High Court. 7
In practice, the system is quite unwieldy for a small country with limited
resources.
In criminal cases, the personal jurisdiction of the Swazi courts is
restricted to instances where the complainant and the accused are "mem-
bers of the Swazi nation," which is a nebulous term generally defined as
acceptance by members of the Swazi ethnic group and not Swazi citizen-
ship.98 In civil matters, all parties must be "members of the Swazi na-
tion."9 9  In criminal matters, customary courts have territorial
jurisdiction if the offense was committed entirely or partially within the
customary court's jurisdictional area." ° In civil matters, the defendant
must be a resident of the territorial area of the court's jurisdiction or the
cause of action must have arisen there.10 1 With certain statutory limita-
tions, the King decides the nature of the civil and criminal matters that
fall under the customary courts' jurisdiction.10 2
As customary law is generally unwritten there are a wide range of
penalties. In criminal cases, any non-capital punishments are allowed by
Swazi customary law as long as they are not contrary to "natural justice
and humanity."'0 3 In addition, punishment must be "commensurate
with the nature and circumstances of the offence and the circumstances
of the offender."" The vagueness of this provision encourages forum
shopping, which is one of the major difficulties with Swaziland's system.
Rules of procedure and evidence are also customary and subject to any
rules made by the King.' In practice, this means the rules are informal.
In addition, lawyers are not entitled to appear in customary courts.
Widespread forum shopping is also encouraged by considerable di-
vergence between national and customary law, particularly in matters of
evidence, family law, estates, and damages. Forum shopping may have
especially serious consequences in criminal matters, although, as a rule,
customary criminal law tends to mirror national criminal law, and the
97. Fix Gama v. P. 1970-76 S.L.R. 462, 462H (1976).
98. Swazi Courts Act 80 of 1950, § 8(2) (Swaz.), reprinted in Laws of Swaziland, supra
note 76, at 446.
99. Id. § 7(1).
100. Id. § 8(2).
101. Id. § 7(1).
102. Id. §§ Il(b), 7(1), 3(1).
103. Id. § 12. Works on Swazi customary law are J. FANNIN, PRELIMINARY NOTES ON
PRINCIPLES OF SWAZI CUSTOMARY LAW (1967); BRIAN MARWICK. THE SWAZI (1940),
NEVILLE RUBIN, THE LAW OF MARRIAGE AND DISSOLUTION OF MARRIAGE (1964), No
more recent works have been published.
104. Swazi Courts Act 80 of 1950, reprinted in Laws of Swaziland, supra note 76, at 446.
105. Id. §§ 21, 39-40.
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choice of forum in criminal cases is a matter of executive discretion.
Compounding the general problem, conflict of law rules are scattered
rather than located in one statute.
In some instances, cases may be transferred from the magistrate's
courts, which are lower national courts, to customary courts. Under the
Magistrate's Courts Act of 1938, the clerk of the court may refuse to
issue a summons and insist that a plaintiff bring suit in customary court
if both parties are members of the Swazi nation and if the clerk believes a
customary court is more appropriate. 10 6 The magistrate's court may also
issue such an order, even after a case has been commenced.' 0 7 These
provisions diminish the burden of the magistrate's courts but do not alle-
viate the problem of forum shopping; they were created at a time when
most magistrates were foreigners who did not have the capacity to deal
with issues related to customary law. The presence of foreigners still
plagues the national courts and is perhaps the greatest obstacle to harmo-
nizing the court systems. For example, when a magistrate believes a case
is appropriate for a customary court but does not transfer it, this does not
mean "the magistrate's court, if it hears the case, is obliged to apply
Swazi law and custom. A fortiori is the position the same in the High
Court where there is no machinery for transfer of an action to a Swazi
court." 108
Application of Swazi law in the national courts is difficult because
the majority of judges continue to be foreigners who cannot take judicial
notice of Swazi customary law. Rather, they consider it a matter for
proof. There is, however, little that can be used to prove such law.
There are few texts and decisions of the customary courts are not pub-
lished. 10 To remedy this lack of availability, the High Court often turns
to assessors provided for under the Swazi Courts Act of 1950 and the
High Court Act of 1954.110 The assessors, who are asked to support the
texts on customary law, are not expert witnesses. An additional problem
is that since customary law is dynamic, an assessor's comments on old
texts may bear little resemblance to the prevailing customary legal
realities.
106. Magistrate's Courts Act 66 of 1938, § 16(1)(b) (Swaz.), reprinted in LAWS OF SWAZI-
LAND, supra note 76, at 316.
107. Id.
108. Dlamini v. Nglengethwa, 1977-78 S.L.R. 79, 81 (Nathan, CJ.).
109. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
110. Swazi Courts Act of 1950, § 35, supra note 76, at 446; High Court Act 20 of 1954,
§ 6(1)0b) (Swaz.), reprinted in LAWS OF SWAZILAND, supra note 76, at 246.
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In order that justice may be done more efficiently, many changes are
required. As Chief Justice Nathan wrote in Fix Gama v. R.,
[T]he Swazi Courts Act requires revision and streamlining in many
respects.... Firstly the system of appeals through the Swazi Court of
Appeal, Higher Court of Appeal, and Judicial Commissioner to the
High Court and thence, if necessary, to the Appeal Court, is in my
opinion unnecessarily prolix and cumbersome. Secondly,... [t]he...
qualifications and powers [of a judicial commissioner] should be rede-
fined. The third matter that should receive attention is that machinery
should be introduced to achieve a closer liaison between the Swazi
courts and the office of the Director of Public Prosecutions than exists
at present. In particular it should be defined what cases are proper for
hearing in the Swazi National Court and what in the ordinary
subordinate courts."1 '
The need to clarify the conflict of law rules is also urgent. One solution
would be a rule that customary law will apply in civil matters unless both
parties clearly intend national law to apply. Another possible rule would
empower or even require customary courts to apply national criminal
law since the two types of law tend to be closely related.
Perhaps most important, however, will be efforts to indigenize the
judiciary. Judges should be chosen from the law graduates of the Uni-
versity of Swaziland, who should receive training in customary law in
every subject on the curriculum. Indigenization will enable all courts to
take notice of customary law. In addition, indigenization will allow legal
reform to be influenced by those best equipped to effect a transformation
that is sensitive to the demands of efficiency and constraints of limited
funds and, at the same time, is responsive to the needs and desires of the
people.
2. Lesotho
Lesotho is a tiny, landlocked country entirely surrounded by South
Africa. With few resources, its one million inhabitants are in the worst
economic position of any of the inhabitants of the countries under study,
even though they have one of Africa's highest literacy rates.iz Legal
dualism, an enduring legacy of colonial rule, began in Lesotho (then
known as Basutoland) with General Law Proclamation 2B of 1884. I 11
The Proclamation provided that the British High Commissioner in Cape
111. Fix Gama v. R., 1970-76 S.L.R. 462, 464C-F (1976).
112. The best history of Lesotho to 1870 is LEONARD THOMPSON, SURVIVAL IN Two
WORLDS: MOSHOESHOE OF LESOTHO 1786-1870 (1975).
113. General Law Proclamation 2B (1884) (Basutoland).
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Town would administer the area through the Deputy Commissioner for
the Basutoland Protectorate who, in turn, was to be represented locally
by a Resident Commissioner.'" 4 A curious separation of powers was ef-
fected in 1911 with the establishment of the Court of the Resident
Commissioner.' Thereafter, the Resident Commissioner was still re-
sponsible to the High Commissioner in administrative matters, but an-
swered to the Privy Council in London for judicial ones. The Resident
Commissioner's Court, acting in accordance with the 1884 Proclama-
tion, applied customary law in all cases between Africans.1 16 Later, a
Judicial Commissioner took charge of the Resident Commissioner's
Court and in 1938 the Native Courts Proclamation, later renamed the
Central and Local Courts Proclamation, established the dual system that
continues to the present day. 1 7 The proclamation provided for national
and customary courts. Customary courts were inferior to the national
courts and their presidency went not to "traditional" chiefs but to gov-
ernment appointees.
18
As in Swaziland, there is dualism of both laws and courts. The na-
tional law is the hybrid system of Roman, Roman-Dutch, and English
law supplemented by statute and case law. 119 Customary law is governed
by the repugnancy clause in section 9 of the Central and Local Courts
Proclamation 62 of 1938.20 It provides that customary law is law used
by the people which is not repugnant to "justice or morality" or inconsis-
tent with legislation.' 2 ' Although the repugnancy clause appears in leg-
islation regarding the customary courts, in the 1983 case of Potlane Ntle
v. Khubelu Manthona Khaketla, Judge Goldin of the Court of Appeal
wrote that "it could never have been intended that in applying customary
law in other courts... it can be done regardless of its repugnancy to
morality or justice." 122 He went on to give the phrase "justice or moral-
ity" a broad construction, arguing that:
Lesotho customary law will not be condemned or not applied on the
ground that it is repugnant to justice and morality merely because it is
different from and does not accord with concepts of morality or justice
114. Id.
115. See generally VERNON PALMER & SEBASTIAN M. POULTES., THE LEGAL SYSTEM OF
LESOTHO (1972).
116. Id. at 127.
117. Central and Local Courts Proclamation 62 (1938) (Lesotho).
118. Id.
119. See supra notes 45-75 and accompanying text.
120. Central and Local Courts Proclamation 62, § 9.
121. Id.
122. Potlane Ntle v. Khubelu Manthona Khaketla, Civil Appeal 3 (1983).
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under Roman-Dutch law. It is implicit and obvious that where two
systems of law exist, each of them may be based on different principles
or concepts of morality or justice.
1 23
In practice, the High Court has used the repugnancy clause in only
a few cases. The most likely explanation is that, as in Swaziland, most
High Court members have been foreigners. Indeed, until 1974, all of
them were foreigners. Thus, it was difficult for the judges to rule on a
system of law foreign to them. The members of the Hight Court also had
difficulties applying customary law in either the first instance or on ap-
peal. Again, the problems of ascertaining the customary law are reminis-
cent of those in Swaziland.
Before independence in 1966, High Court judges also used assessors
or expert witnesses. Sometimes they required that customary law be
proved as if it were a local custom under the national law. This meant
that the party proving it had to show that the customary law rule was
well-established and "reasonable." 24 Since independence, the High
Court has taken judicial notice of customary law and generally acted on
its own even in cases where it had to apply customary law as a court of
the first instance. Customary law must be proved only if "its content or
authority is brought into question and the matter cannot be determined
in any other, more convenient manner."'
2
The shift in practice can be attributed to three main factors. First,
the judiciary began to be indigenized and the new judges believed that
requiring proof of customary law demeaned Lesotho's independent sta-
tus. Second, an increasing number of works on Basotho law appeared,
including the Laws of Lerotholi, which is a statement of customary law
on which courts can rely.'26 In addition, several textbooks on Basotho
customary law were published.127 Unfortunately, these may hinder the
development of modem jurisprudence because none of these is more re-
cent than the 1970s and customary law is particularly fluid. Third, there
is a growing body of customary law precedent. However, this influence
is limited because Judicial Commissioner's Court and customary court
decisions are not published and no readily available compendium exists
123. Id.
124. See Bereng Griffith v. 'Mantsebo Seeiso Griffith, 1926-53 H.C.T.L.R. 50 (1943).
125. T.W. BENNETT, THE APPLICATION OF CUSTOMARY LAw IN SOUTHERN AFRIcA 34
(1985).
126. The Laws of Lerotholi are discussed in Sebastian Poulter, The Place of the Laws of
Lerotholi in the Legal System of Lesotho , 71 AFR. AFF. 144 (1972).
127. See, eg., PATRICK DUNCAN, SOTHO LAWS AND CusToMs (1960); VERNON PALMER,
THE ROMAN-DUTCH AND SESOTHO LAW OF DELICT (1970); SEBASTIAN M. POULTER, F%\t-
ILY LAW AND LITIGATION IN BASOTHO SOCIETY (1976).
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for perusal by judges. Even if these were available, judges would have to
be attuned to the dynamic nature of the system.
Generally, the customary courts apply customary law and the na-
tional courts use the national law, except when hearing appeals from cus-
tomary courts. The General Law Proclamation 2B of 1884, as amended,
gave the national courts the discretion to apply customary law when they
serve as courts of the first instance if all parties to a suit are "Afri-
cans." 128 Under the General Interpretation Proclamation 12 of 1942, an
African was "any aboriginal African belonging to any tribe of Africa,
and all persons of mixed race living as members of any African Commu-
nity, tribe, kraal, village or location in the Territory."' 29 Today, the
meaning is not clear because a 1977 Proclamation repealed the 1942 law
and left the determination to the court. 130 Although the High Court Act
of 1978 indicates that the High Court can consent to be the court of first
instance in civil cases or cases falling under the jurisdiction of a magis-
trate's or customary court, the High Court has signalled that it does not
wish to be a court of the first instance for cases arising under customary
law. 1
3 1
This High Court preference for maintaining a dual court system
which is slightly less strictly divided than the Swazi has resulted in a
lengthy, unwieldy appeals process and widespread forum shopping. For
example, a case begun in a customary court may go to four additional
courts before it is finally decided. Under the Central and Local Courts
Proclamation of 1938, appeals lie from the local to the central courts,
from the central courts to the Judicial Commissioner's Court, from the
Judicial Commissioner's Court to the High Court, and from the High
Court to the Court of Appeal, Lesotho's highest court. Appeals to the
High Court and the Court of Appeal require the permission of the court
concerned. 132 Moreover, appeals to the Court of Appeal must be on a
point of law.
133
When a matter reaches a central court or the Judicial Commis-
sioner's Court, these courts may decide the case or order that it be sent
back to the court of the first instance or to another customary or magis-
trate's court. 134 Magistrate's courts also have review powers with regard
128. General Law Proclamation 2B.
129. General Interpretation Proclamation 12 (1942) (Lesotho).
130. Interpretation Act 19 (1977) (Lesotho).
131. See, e.g., Chieftainess Chabaseoele v. Sekese Mohale, 1977 L.L.R. 283 (1977).
132. Central and Local Courts Proclamation 62, § 27.
133. Id. § 28.
134. Id. § 30.
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to customary courts.1 35 These allow them to hear the case or send it to
another customary or magistrate's court. Not surprisingly, a case may
take years to reach the Court of Appeal, which suffers from an inade-
quate number of staffers. Also hindering the efficiency of the appeal pro-
cess is another colonial relic, the Judicial Commissioner's Court, a circuit
court which sits only once a year in each district.
Forum shopping is a particular problem. It is most commonly re-
sorted to by the plaintiff in civil cases and by the public prosecutor in
criminal cases. Choice of forum may determine the result in a case be-
cause each type of court has different rules of procedure and evidence
and, in some cases, the remedies offered for the same problem are differ-
ent. There are few statutory conflict of law rules to ameliorate the situa-
tion; these are found mostly in the 1938 Central and Local Courts
Proclamation as amended.136 This has meant that the courts have devel-
oped their own rules to deal with situations such as marriage and succes-
sion.1 37  Accordingly, such rules are confusing and not entirely
successful.
This difficult system should be revised if people are to feel that the
court system is responsive to their needs. To do this would require some
of the same changes argued for in the Swazi case. First, Lesotho's law
school should integrate customary law into every aspect of the curricu-
lum. Second, the judiciary should be indigenized as much as possible
with graduates of that law school. Third, these lawyers and judges
should work together to harmonize the conflict of law rules and dimin-
ish, if not obliterate, forum shopping. Given that the court system is less
strictly divided than in Swaziland, work in integration of the court sys-
tem could begin with careful consultation of affected communities.
Where there is public support, legal unification could begin. Criminal
law seems particularly ripe for such an attempt because criminal law in-
volves the least amount of conflict between national and customary law.
Unification efforts in civil matters would be less practical at this stage,
but the Court of Appeal has taken a step which may eventually lead in
that direction. In the 1983 child support case Robert Potlane Ntle v.
Khubelu Manthona Khaketla, the Court determined national law would
supplement the customary law in a situation where application of the
customary law would leave the child without assistance.1 38 While the
135. Id. § 26.
136. Id.
137. See, eg., Molungoa Bolei Khatala v. Francina Bold Khatala, 1963 H.C.T.LR. 97
(1964); Evelina Rakhoabe v. Jeriel Rakhoabe. 1967-70 L.LRt 210 (1969).
138. Potlane Ntle v. Khubelu Manthona Khaketlu, Civil Appeal 3 (1983).
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decision in Ntle was exceptional, it nevertheless may have signalled the
beginning of a trend that ultimately will result in unification.
3. Botswana
Formerly the Bechuanaland protectorate, Botswana, which is
largely desert, is about the size of France and has a population of one
million people.139 Unlike the vast majority of African states, Botswana is
a democracy. Its democratic tradition was not developed under western
influence, but rather is centuries old. 1'4
Like its neighbors, Swaziland and Lesotho, Botswana inherited a
dual legal system. The country received the common law in the General
Administration Proclamation of 1891 in a form almost identical to that
of Lesotho. 41 In 1909 the General Law Proclamation altered it to pro-
vide that:
[T]he laws in force in the Colony of the Cape of Good Hope on the
10th day of June, 1898, shall mutatis mutandis and so far as not inap-
plicable be the laws in force and to be observed in the said Protector-
ate, but no statute of the Colony of the Cape of Good Hope,
promulgated after the 10th day of June, 1891, shall be deemed to ap-
ply, or to have applied to the said protectorate unless specially applied
thereto by Proclamation.
1 42
The addition of the phrase mutatis mutandis, which did not appear in the
earlier version, indicated that, unlike in Lesotho, the clause included
both the written and the common law of the Cape Colony. 143 With the
reception of western law came the dual system which Botswana began to
change in the 1960s. It is not clear that the country is currently moving
toward a unified system.
The unification which has occurred is primarily in law and to a
lesser extent, in the structure of the court system. The major instrument
regarding customary law is the Customary Law Act of 1969.144 For pur-
poses of the legislation, customary law is the law of any "tribe or tribal
community" which is not at odds with the written law or "contrary to
morality, humanity or natural justice." 145 The Act defines a "tribesman"
139. See generally THOMAS TLOU & ALEC CAMPBELL, HISTORY Op BOTSWANA (1984).
140. Id.
141. General Administration Proclamation § 19 (1891) (Bots.); see supra note 113 and ac-
companying text.
142. General Law Proclamation § 2 (1909) (Bots.).
143. See id.
144. Customary Law Act (1969) (Bots.). The Act is further described in C.M.G. Him-
sworth, The Botswana Customary Law Act, 1969, 16 J. AFR. L. 4 (1972).
145. Customary Law Act § 2. While modern scholars generally eschew the words "tribe,"
[Vol. 15
Customary Law
as a member of a tribe or section of a tribe; or a member of a tribal
community, a community organized in a tribal manner living outside a
tribal territory; or a member of a tribe or tribal community of any other
African country as prescribed by the Minister of Justice by a notice pub-
lished in the Government Gazette.1" However, neither the Act nor the
Interpretation and General Provisions Act of 1973 reveals how tribal
membership is to be determined.1 47
The issue of who is a tribesman occasionally arises when a party
claims not to be one. In such cases, the Act refers the matter to the
Customary Courts Commissioner who, after due inquiry, issues a certifi-
cate which binds the party to his finding.14 To make his determination,
the Commissioner must rely on customary law and must decide whether
the customary law is the same as in Swaziland and Lesotho.149
Although, section 4 of the Act makes it applicable in disputes be-
tween tribesmen, section 5 provides that the common law governs in dis-
putes between tribesmen and others unless the parties intended to use or
expressly consented to the application of customary law.11 Unlike the
law in Swaziland and Lesotho, the Act codifies almost all the internal
conflict of law rules in one place.151 For example, section 6 requires that
in all child custody cases, regardless of whether both parties are
tribesmen, the welfare of the children is to be the supreme considera-
tion.'52 Section 7 provides that customary law applies in cases of intes-
tate succession when tribesmen are involved."5 3 Section 8 stipulates that
for tribesmen the common law action for damages for death or personal
injury is preserved. 4 Section 9 indicates that when there is a question as
to which customary law applies, a tribesman's legal status must be deter-
mined under his own customary law. 1 5
While these clauses deal with conflicts between customary law and
"tribesman," and "tribal," these words will be retained in this article when legislation using
them is discussed.
146. Id. § 4.
147. Interpretation and General Provisions Act of 1973 (Bots.).
148. Customary Courts Act of 1961, § 2(3) (Bots.).
149. See supra notes 109-10, 124-27 and accompanying text. Texts on Tswana law include
SIMON ROBERTS, 5 REsTATEMENT OF AFRICAN LAW: BOTSWANA I, TSWANA FAMILY LkW
(Antony N. Allott et al. eds., 1972); IsAAC ScHAPERA, A HANDBOOK OF TsWANA LAW AND
CUSTOM (2d ed. 1955).
150. Customary Courts Act of 1961, §§ 4-5.
151. Id. §§ 6-10.
152. Id. § 6.
153. Id. § 7.
154. Id. § 8.
155. Id. § 9.
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common law, conflicts between different sets of customary law also arise.
This is an important area of law because, unlike Swaziland and Lesotho,
Botswana's African population is not ethnically homogeneous. 15 6 The
majority Tswana Group is divided into the Kgatla, the Kwena, the
Malete, the Ngwaketse, the Ngwato, the Rolong, and the Tlokwa. Other
ethnic groups are the Birwa, the Herero, the Kalanga, the Kgalagadi, the
Mbukushu, the Sarwa, and the Subiya.
Section 10 addresses this inter-customary law problem. It provides
that with regard to land matters, the applicable customary law is that of
the place where the land is located. 157 In inheritance cases where no land
is at issue, the customary law is that applying to the deceased.I58 For all
other matters, the customary law is either that which the parties intended
or of the place where the action arose. 159 Of course, in modem Botswana
it may not always be possible to ascertain the customary law of the place
where the action arose. For example, what is the customary law of the
modem city of Gaborone? Fortunately, the drafters of the legislation
foresaw this problem and provided in section 10(2) of the Act that "if the
customary law is not ascertainable, the court shall determine the matter
in accordance with the principles of justice, equity and good
conscience."160
Finally, the Act deals with the ascertainment of customary law.
Before the Act's passage, the national courts treated customary law as a
factual matter which had to be proven. 161 They could not take judicial
notice of it. The Act permits judicial notice to be taken but if a court is
uncertain about a particular facet of customary law, it can consult re-
ported cases, textbooks, or experts.162 In addition, any statements of cus-
tomary law authorized by the country's president are to be admissible as
prima facie evidence of customary law in any court. 163 In practice, be-
cause most judges are foreigners, they tend to rely on a few restatement-
style publications which fail to capture the dynamic nature of customary
law.
Unlike the dualistic private law system, Botswana's public law sys-
tem is becoming unified. An almost uniform system of substantive crimi-
156. There are some Nyuni as opposed to Sotho people in Lesotho but they do not question
the system of customary law.
157. Customary Courts Act.
158. Id. § 100)(b).
159. Id. § 10(1)(c).
160. Id. § 10(2).
161. See, e.g., Gideon v. Malusalila, 1926-53 H.C.T.L.R. 114, 115E.
162. Customary Courts Act of 1961, § 11.
163. Id. § 12.
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nal law derives from the 1964 Penal Code,' 64 the 1968 African Courts
(Amendment and Supplementary Provisions) Act,1 65 and the 1972 Cus-
tomary Courts Amendment Act. 16 In terms of public authority, the
1965 Chieftainship Act 167 regulated the recognition and functions of
chiefs and the 1968 Tribal Land Act and Matimela Act 161 gave all the
major administrative powers of chiefs with regard to land and stray cattle
to "non-tribal" public bodies.
The country's 1966 Constitution contained a bill of rights which
presumably would have nullified the operation of customary law norms
that conflicted with it.' 69 However, the incorporation of a number of
provisions protected certain aspects of customary law. For example, sec-
tion 6(3)(e) of the Bill of Rights does not include in its protection from
forced labor "any labor reasonably required as part of reasonable and
normal communal or other civic obligations." ' Section 7(2) preserves
forms of punishment existing prior to independence."' Section 10(12)(b)
makes an exception in favor of customary law from the constitutional
provision that the accused must have legal representation.17 2 With re-
gard to customary law, section 15(4)(c) makes inapplicable the constitu-
tional provision that no law shall be discriminatory, either on its face or
in its application, in cases where a law makes provision regarding private
law matters. 73 Furthermore, section 15(4)(d) stipulates that protection
from discrimination will not apply to a law which provides for the appli-
cation of customary law. 74
Despite its considerable progress toward unification of legislation,
Botswana remains behind Lesotho in terms of unification of the court
system. The colonial court structure remains intact. The national courts
use the national law as their primary law and the customary courts use
customary law. The customary courts, however, are subordinate to the
national courts.
The statutory authority for the customary courts is contained in the
164. PENAL CODE (Bots.).
165. African Courts (Amendment and Supplementary Provisions) Act 1968 (Bots.).
166. Customary Courts Amendment Act of 1972 (Bots.).
167. Chieftainship Act of 1965 (Bots.).
168. Tribal and Matimela Act (1968) (Bots.).
169. BoTS. INDEPENDENCE CONST. ch. 2 (1966), reprinted in I CoNSTrruTIONS OF AFRI-
CAN STATES, supra note 80, at 39.
170. Id. § 6(3)(e).
171. Id. § 7(2).
172. Id. § 10(12)(b).
173. Id. § 15(4)(c).
174. Id. § 15(4)(d).
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1961 Customary Courtt Act. 75 It establishes a hierarchy of customary
courts, including a customary court of appeal, which are below a hierar-
chy of national courts. 176 A Customary Courts Commissioner oversees
the operation of the customary courts. He exercises discretion "in the
interests of justice" in transferring cases from one customary court to
another or from a customary court to a national court.
17 7
Besides indicating that customary law is to apply in the customary
courts with certain exceptions, the Customary Courts Act adds an inno-
vative distinction between criminal and civil cases, a separation non-exis-
tent in customary law.17 8 The customary courts have criminal personal
jurisdiction only over "tribesmen" or those who agree in writing to the
courts' jurisdiction.1 79 Territorial jurisdiction extends to offenses com-
mitted either wholly or partly within the customary court's area,
although the Customary Courts Commissioner may, following the re-
quest of the accused, transfer the case to another customary court or a
lower national court. 180 The Customary Courts Act excludes certain of-
fenses from the courts' purview. These are treason, riot, offenses affect-
ing the security or safety of the state, offenses which are alleged to have
resulted in a death, bigamy, "corruption and abuse of office," "offences
relating to the administration of justice," bribery, offenses involving
counterfeit currency, robbery if the accused is twenty-one years old or
older, extortion, bankruptcy and company law, rape, offenses relating to
precious metals and precious stones, and any other offenses that may be
prescribed.81 With these exceptions, the criminal jurisdiction of the cus-
tomary courts is the same as that of the national courts.
Procedural and evidentiary matters are governed by the 1971 Cus-
tomary Courts (Procedure) Rules which were promulgated under the
Customary Courts Act.18 2 According to High Court Judge Corduff in
the 1981 case of S. v. Thokomelo, "there is substantially less difference
than might be supposed between the law and rules of evidence and proce-
dure applicable in customary courts and those applicable in other
courts."18 1 In applying substantive law, the customary courts utilize cus-
175. Customary Courts Act of 1961.
176. Id.
177. Id. § 2.
178. Id. § 12.
179. Id. § 11(1)(a).
180. Id. § 11(1)(b).
181. Id. § 12.
182. Customary Courts (Procedure) Rules (1971) (Bots.).
183. S. v. Thokmelo, 1981 B.L.R. 272, 275.
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tomary criminal law, but they may consult the Penal Code."' As for
sentencing, customary courts may impose fines and/or imprisonment or
authorize corporal punishment.18 Perhaps, the government will amend
the legislation to authorize the customary courts to administer the Penal
Code and then abolish the customary law entirely so that all courts are
operating according to the same written norms. Such a change, however,
must not be forced upon the people lest it produce resistance.
In civil cases, customary courts have jurisdiction if all parties are
"tribesmen" or if the defendant consents in writing to the court's juris-
diction. 8 6 Territorial jurisdiction exists when the defendant is ordinarily
resident within the area of the customary court's jurisdiction or the cause
of action arose there in its entirety.1 87 The Minister of Local Govern-
ment and Lands determines the courts' material civil jurisdiction. 88 The
Customary Courts Act, however, excludes certain causes of action from
the jurisdiction of the customary courts. These are cases of divorce, nul-
lification, or separation for marriages not concluded according to cus-
tomary law; testate succession and the affairs of decedents where the
national law applies; bankruptcy and other transactions non-existent
under customary law; and witchcraft unless the Customary Courts Com-
missioner gave his consent.18 9 As in criminal cases, the Customary
Courts (Procedure) Rules govern the rules of procedure and evidence."
The national and customary rules in civil cases differ more markedly
than they do in criminal cases but, as Chief Justice Dendy Young per-
haps too optimistically has commented, there nevertheless remains the
"fundamental, all-pervasive rule of fairness, sometimes called natural jus-
tice, [which] still demands that no evidence shall be relied upon unless
the opposing party has been given an opportunity to comment thereon
and to contradict it in the proceedings under way."1 91 The substantive
law used by customary courts may also include national law provisions
authorized for their use by the national law or ministerial order.192
Since, as the foregoing demonstrates, a case may be brought in a
national court even though a customary court also has jurisdiction, fo-
rum shopping has become quite widespread. The legislature addressed
184. Customary Courts Act of 1961, § 4.
185. Id. §§ 11(2), 11(5), 16-19.
186. Id. § 100)(a).
187. Id. § 10(1)(b).
188. Id. § 6.
189. Id. § 12.
190. Customary Courts (Procedure) Rules 1971.
191. Gombgwa v. Gombgwa, High Ct. Civ. App. 3 (1970).
192. Customary Courts Act of 1961, § 15.
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the problem by adding a provision to the Subordinate Courts Proclama-
tion limiting the election of forum.193 It provides that if a lower national
court feels that customary law is appropriate, it will transfer the case to a
customary court, provided that such an action is not contrary to "the
interests of justice." 194 Unfortunately, this phrase is vague and therefore,
in practice, forum shopping has not been eliminated.
Recognizing the appeal of unification of the law and the courts, the
Botswana Parliament in 1979 created a Law Reform Committee of nine
members of Parliament, including the Attorney-General. 95 Unfortu-
nately, the Parliamentary Standing Committee has achieved little be-
cause it is comprised mostly of lay parliamentarians instead of a
relatively independent group of experts meeting on a continuous basis.
Although Botswana has limited resources, it would do well to model its
Committee on the more successful Commonwealth commissions found
in Australia, Britain, Canada, and New Zealand, among other places. In
its favor, unlike Namibia, Botswana does have a university with a law
department which for nearly a decade has been producing graduates
trained not only in the national law but also in the customary law.
Although there are still many foreign judges, it is presumably the gradu-
ates of Botswana's law school who eventually will dominate the judici-
ary. That process may give further impetus to the unification of the laws
and the courts.
The government should be mindful not to destroy the local power
bases of the chiefs' courts, particularly because their democratic and,
more recently, non-sexist behavior is a source of considerable national
pride and stability. However, the time has come to unify the court sys-
tems. This could be achieved without major social upheavals by building
on moves already made toward unification and gradually empowering
customary courts to apply national law. At the same time, the legislature
should harmonize national and customary law whenever practical.
Training of customary court personnel in the national law could be con-
ducted by advanced law students and graduates. Ultimately, the custom-
ary courts could be given the same status as the lower national courts.
This move would preserve the local power bases of chiefs and make the
Customary Courts Commissioner unnecessary.
However, the question of how to deal with the customary courts of
appeal would remain. Under the proposed system the lower customary
193. Subordinate Courts Proclamation § 31A.
194. Id.




courts are bound by precedent and the judiciary is indigenized. Thus, it
would be possible to eliminate these appellate customary courts without
much opposition because local power bases would remain intact and the
national appellate court judges would be sensitive to customary values in
rendering their decisions.
IV. THE WAY FORWARD? AN INTEGRATION MODEL
FOR NAMIBIA
In Namibia, the sordid legacy of German and then South African
rule has left the inheritors of its fragile democracy with daunting
problems of social welfare which demand urgent attention. To ensure
the efficient administration of justice, while at the same time abiding by
the constitutional guarantee of a right to culture, the Namibian Govern-
ment should follow an integration model. This approach would mean
integrating the plurality of systems as much as possible; the systems of
customary law followed by the various ethnic groups would be harmo-
nized with one another and with the supreme, national law. While dur-
ing unification the imposition of a uniform law is more desirable in terms
of efficiency, integration is more viable for the foreseeable future because
it will bring together laws of diverse origins without obliterating them
and will minimize social dislocation. Integration is a juridical halfway
house between pluralism and uniformity. It allows varying laws to con-
tinue to exist but attempts to standardize and remove conflicts between
them.
Integration will not be achieved easily because of fundamental dif-
ferences between customary law and the national law. Despite the on-
slaught of corrupting colonial influences, customary law has remained
communal. National law, on the other hand, is more individualistic in
nature. Under customary law, kinship permeates the social structure;
legal proceedings are about the community as much as the individual.
The goal is to foster reconciliation and harmony within the community.
As a result of this orientation, customary law is non-specialized and un-
written. 196 The lack of legislation and written law makes it difficult to
determine precedent; decisions generally are not reported. Codes such as
the Laws of Lerotholi in Lesotho 97 and the Zulu Code in South Africa' 9 8
are restatements and not bodies of original legislation. Treatises on cus-
tomary law, as in Swaziland, are few and not necessarily reflective of the
196. See supra notes 38-39, 109-10, 124-27 and accompanying text.
197. See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
198. ZULU CODE.
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dynamic nature of customary law. 199 Moreover, the emphasis on concili-
ation and communalism makes it difficult for western-trained jurists to
think of customary law in terms of the national law, which follows the
western division of public and private law.
Nevertheless, if Namibian jurists are to make strides in modifying
the legal system, the content of customary law must be determined pre-
cisely. Attempts at ascertainment and restatement have been made in
Malawi, Kenya, and certain countries of West Africa with varying de-
grees of success.20° However, carrying out such a project in Namibia will
be particularly difficult. There are only a few African lawyers and, con-
sequently, only a few qualified jurists who are proficient in any of the
indigenous linguages.2°' Compounding the problem, most of these Afri-
can lawyers received their training abroad in schools which do not at-
tempt to imbue students with sensitivity to customary law and legal
institutions °. 2 2 Also, these lawyers have not been trained in the research
and fieldwork techniques that would be required for a project of ascer-
taining customary law. The lawyers could be accompanied by anthropol-
ogists who would probably be white because of the small number of
educated black Namibians. Thus, the anthropologists would almost cer-
tainly have to work through a translator and would conceivably be
viewed with suspicion by their informants. As few have studied
Namibia's peoples, there is a real prospect that many errors of interpreta-
tion would be made in the comparison of laws. There is a lesser problem
of identifying who the informants should be; presumably the consulta-
tions should be with as many of the most respected 'members of the rele-
vant communities as possible so that their shared values will emerge.
Once the law is ascertained, the next step would be to integrate it.
This would mean the creation of a single legal system applicable to all.
Integration should occur in two phases. First, in the initial period, the
basic dualism of the legal system would remain but the laws of different
ethnic groups would be harmonized according to the process described
above and standardized. Second, after a period of time in which, hope-
fully, the process of nation-building will create a favorable social climate,
the diverse systems of customary and national law could be replaced with
one system which would allow for dualism when necessary.
By only harmonizing customary laws, some African countries have
199. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
200. See generally Allott, supra note 27, at 65-70.
201. Among Namibian advocates in private practice, there are only two blacks. Among
Namibian attorneys in private practice, just four are black.
202. The University of Namibia does not yet have a law school.
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stopped short of entering the second phase. The argument advanced in
such cases, as in Tanzania for example, is that differences in customary
law divide the country.2"3 Thus, in the 1960s, with the express objective
of fostering national unity, the Tanzanian government began a unifica-
tion program which produced only superficial uniformity."0 However, it
is imperative that customary law be reconciled with the national law be-
cause conflicts between the two are more likely to generate problems
than the few conflicts between varieties of customary law. Such custom-
ary-national conflicts will continue to occur if customary law is made
uniform or even codified.
The road to customary-national integration may be a long and diffi-
cult one. Particular attention should be paid to procedural problems.
Conflict of law rules must be developed and made statutory. For sim-
plicity's sake, these should be located in a single statute for all areas of
the law. In addition, a rule might be adopted that customary law will
apply in civil matters unless both parties clearly intend national law to
apply. A further rule might empower or even require customary courts
to apply national criminal law, a field where the two types of law tend to
be closely related anyway.20 5 Such changes would help eradicate the
problem of forum shopping which plagues the national courts in African
countries.
National courts also must be required to take judicial notice of cus-
tomary law. Even once the ascertainment called for above is completed,
the position of customary law in national courts will remain the same as
long as the judiciary is dominated by foreigners. Given the lack of
Namibian lawyers, that will certainly be the case for some time. If black
judges who did not participate in the ascertainment process are chosen
from other African countries or from among Namibia's handful of black
lawyers, the situation will remain the same until those lawyers receive
training in customary law.
Training of the lay magistracy in customary law is also imperative.
Currently, such training does not occur. Training requires the develop-
ment of a Namibian law school with a curriculum tailored to the needs of
the country. At such a school, customary law should be part of each
subject and required for graduation. Particular attention should be de-
203. See Ghai, supra note 40 and accompanying text.
204. Id.
205. To require customary courts to do so and to apply other more sensitive aspects of
national law such as provisions prohibiting discrimination against women will necessitate that
"traditional" leaders be given some inducement for so doing; such an inducement might take
the form of economic benefits for the "traditional" leaders' constituents.
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voted to inculcating the view that customary law is neither inferior nor
ineffective compared with the national, western-style law. The law
school could also serve as a venue for the training of magistrates.
Perhaps the ultimate goal of integration should be to make eventual
unification possible. As demonstrated above, in Botswana there is a defi-
nite trend toward unification. However, unification in Namibia is far off.
Before government officials and jurists should even begin to think of uni-
fication schemes, many other battles must be waged and won, including
national reconciliation, eradicating illiteracy, and expanding the econ-
omy. It will only be in such a changed environment that unification will
gain popular support and thrive.
CONCLUSION
Namibia's Constitution contains many human rights guarantees.
While a number of its provisions indicate that customary law will con-
tinue to exist, the form in which it will do so remains unclear. As the
Namibian Government endeavors to determine the place of customary
law in the new Namibian legal order, it has many options. Some African
governments in their zeal to create uniformity and speed development
have chosen to abandon customary law; others have maintained a strict
dualism between customary and national law. Unification has generally
been unsuccessful. A survey of the experiences of three of Namibia's
southern African neighbors, Swaziland, Lesotho, and Botswana shows
that dualism is also fraught with problems. Accordingly, Namibia
should adopt an integration model. This would mean integrating the
plurality of systems as much as possible; the systems of customary law
followed by the various ethnic groups would be harmonized with one
another and with the supreme, national law. Such a plan would foster
the social harmony that one day may make unification possible.
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